SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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NEGLIGENCE-FIREMAN'S

RULE-PROPERTY OWNER IMMUNIZED

FROM LIABILITY FOR ORDINARY ACT OF NEGLIGENCE WHICH
INJURES FIREFIGHTER OR POLICE OFFICER WHERE THAT NEG-

LIGENCE CONSTITUTES RISK INHERENT IN OR INCIDENT To
THE OFFICER'S DUTY OF PERFORMANCE.-Rosa v. Dunkin'

Donuts of Passaic, 122 N.J. 66, 583 A.2d 1129 (1991).
While on duty, the plaintiff policeman, OfficerJose Rosa, responded to a medical emergency call at the defendant Dunkin'
Donuts store, located in Passaic, New Jersey, where an ill employee had become unconscious. 122 N.J. at 69, 583 A.2d at
1130. In carrying the employee on a stretcher from the store to
an ambulance, the plaintiff slipped on a white powdery substance
scattered on the donut shop's kitchen floor. Officer Rosa sustained unspecified injuries.
Officer Rosa filed suit against Dunkin' Donuts of Passaic and
its owner, claiming that the defendant was liable for negligently
permitting the white powdery substance to remain on the kitchen
floor, for its existence there constituted a reasonably foreseeable
risk of harm which the defendant was duty-bound to prevent. Id.
at 69-70, 583 A.2d at 1130. The plaintiff contended that the fireman's rule precluded action against the property owner only
where the owner's ordinary act of negligence occasioned the officer's presence on the site where the officer was injured. Id. at
68, 583 A.2d at 1130. In its motion for summary judgment, the
defendant claimed that the fireman's rule also barred suit stemming from an ordinary act of negligence arising from the officer's
normal duties. Id. at 70, 583 A.2d at 1130. Upon the trial court's
grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
appealed. Id. The appellate court unanimously affirmed the
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, maintaining that the fireman's rule barred an injured officer from recovering against the property owner where the latter's ordinary act of
negligence constituted an inherent risk in the situation to which
the officer responded. Id., 583 A.2d at 1130-31. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted certification. Id., 583 A.2d at 1131.
In affirming the appellate court's grant of summary judgment, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the fireman's rule
precluded liability for injuries arising from an ordinary act of
negligence which created a risk "incidental to and inherent in the
performance of the officer's duties." Id. at 76, 583 A.2d at 1134.
In considering the scope of fireman's rule immunity, the court
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framed the underlying issue as whether the fireman's rule immunizes ordinary acts of negligence other than those that occasion
the officer's presence on the premises, namely, an ordinary act of
negligence that an officer might reasonably expect to encounter
in the performance of his duties. Id. at 68-69, 583 A.2d at 1130.
Writing for the court, Justice Garibaldi first analyzed the history of the fireman's rule in New Jersey jurisprudence. Id. at 68,
583 A.2d at 1129-30. The state supreme court's initial recognition of a rule of immunity, as applied to firefighters, barred liability only for negligence which caused an officer's presence on the
property. Id., 583 A.2d at 1129 (citing Krauth v. Geller, 31 NJ.
270, 273-74, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960)). Justice Garibaldi endorsed the economic policy rationale for the fireman's rule articulated by the Krauth court, which refused to subject a property
owner to civil liability for ordinary negligence on behalf of an
injured firefighter. Id. at 71, 583 A.2d at 1131. The Krauth court
maintained that a firefighter, as a trained professional receiving a
salary and workmen's compensation, should not be entitled to
further recovery for merely assuming risks which are a natural
part of his duty of performance. Id. Observing the court's postKrauth application of the rule to police officers, Justice Garibaldi
acknowledged the established policy mandate against rendering
a property owner liable for an officer's injuries caused by a
merely ordinary act of negligence, where that negligence occasioned the officer's presence on the property. Id. at 71-72, 583
A.2d at 1131 (citing Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 88-89, 459 A.2d
663 (1983)). Justice Garibaldi also recognized the court's refinement of the fireman's rule, which precluded the granting of fireman's rule immunity for willful and wanton misconduct. Id. at 72,
583 A.2d at 1131-32 (citing Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co., 102
N.J. 564, 573-74, 510 A.2d 4, 9 (1986)). Consistent with the
Krauth and Berko decisions, however, the Mahoney court adhered
to the prevailing doctrine of immunizing actors for merely negligent conduct which caused injury to firefighters or police officers
in the normal course of their duties. Id.
The Rosa court then delineated the policy underpinnings of
the fireman's rule. Id., 583 A.2d at 1132. First, the court noted
that ordinary acts of negligence which require the presence of
firefighters or police officers point to the very purpose for the
existence of public service departments paid and trained to handle inherently dangerous situations. Id. Second, the Rosa majority asserted that, by virtue of the nature of their occupation, such

1991]

SURVEY

963

public servants assume the risk that the situations to which they
respond will contain inherent hazards, created by the property
owner's negligence as well as by other sources. Id. Third, the
court declared that property owners should not be held liable for
failing to make the premises safe in anticipation of the arrival of a
firefighter or a police officer, given the unforeseeability of their
presence. Id. at 73, 583 A.2d at 1132. These policies, the majority
posited, called for the rejection of any legal distinction between
an ordinary act of negligence which occasioned an officer's presence and one which "defin[ed] the scene" which an officer encountered in performing his duties. Id. at 74, 583 A.2d at 1133.
Rather, the court charged firefighters and police officers with the
assumption of those risks which an officer should expect to face
in the ordinary course of performance of his duties. Id. at 73, 583
A.2d at 1133. The court stated that such risks, incidental to and
inherent in the officer's duty of performance, included a property owner's ordinary act of negligence existing in the situation
to which the officer responded. Id. at 73-74, 583 A.2d at 1133.
Thus, the majority concluded, immunity under the fireman's rule
applied not only to negligence which merely occasioned the officer's presence, but also to negligence which constituted an inherent risk for the officer in performing his duties. Id. at 74, 583
A.2d at 1133.
While extending the scope of the fireman's rule to encompass negligence constituting an inherent occupational risk for the
firefighter or police officer, the Rosa majority upheld the Mahoney
rejection of willful or intentional misconduct as a basis for immunity from liability. Id. at 75, 583 A.2d at 1133. Moreover, the
court emphasized that only when an officer suffered injuries in
the performance of her duties is she barred from suing the property owner or occupier for an act of ordinary negligence. Id. at
76, 583 A.2d at 1134. The court explained that the fireman's
rule does not preclude a firefighter or police officer from legal
action when she is injured while functioning as a normal citizen
or customer. Id. Further, the court opined that even an ordinary
act which clearly occurred subsequent to the officer's arrival on
the premises may constitute a liability-immune inherent risk
where the subsequent negligent act created hazards inextricably
linked to the very reason for the officer being on the premises.
Id. at 75-76, 583 A.2d at 1134. Thus, despite its recitation of adherence to the Berko rule of no immunity for a subsequent negligent act which injures an officer, the Rosa court asserted that, in
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certain cases, such an act may indeed be entitled to fireman's rule
immunity. Id., 583 A.2d at 1133-34.
In dissent, Justice Handler called for the complete abrogation of the fireman's rule, or, at least, a return to the granting of
immunity only for an ordinary act of negligence which occasioned the officer's presence on the premises. Id. at 85, 583 A.2d
1139 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler criticized the majority's extension of fireman's rule immunity for failing to require
a causal link between the negligent act and the emergency situation, and for creating unavoidable inconsistencies with its "inherent risk" definition of work-related negligence. Id. at 79, 583
A.2d at 1135 (Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent accused the
majority of impermissibly straying from previous holdings which
allowed an injured officer to recover from a negligent actor
where that person was not the one who caused the emergency.
Id. at 80, 583 A.2d at 1136 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The majority's novel definition of the fireman's rule, Justice
Handler contended, immunized the negligence of third persons
to whom the officer owed no duty of care, as long as dealing with
such negligence could be characterized as an inherent part of the
officer's duty of performance. Id. at 83, 583 A.2d at 1138 (Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent expressed great concern over
the ability of courts and juries to make such characterizations,
due to the prohibitive difficulty in distinguishing between inherent/incidental risks and those that are not, and between willful/
wanton acts and those that are not. Id. at 82, 583 A.2d at 1137-38
(Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that placing this
burden on courts and juries would inevitably result in inconsistent and unfair decisions vis-a-vis fireman's rule immunity. Id.
While rejecting the majority's redefinition of the fireman's
rule, Justice Handler suggested the adoption of a common law
negligence approach, grounded in the principles of duty of care,
comparative negligence, and proximate cause, as a means of addressing the issues involved in an officer's response to an emergency call. Id. at 85, 583 A.2d at 1139 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The dissent admitted that it would have reluctantly acceded to a
decision maintaining the pre-Rosa status quo regarding fireman's rule immunity, but Justice Handler adamantly refused to
embrace the majority's broadened version of the rule. Id. at 86,
583 A.2d at 1139-40 (Handler, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent
denounced the majority's "unruly offspring" of the fireman's
rule. Id., 583 A.2d at 1140 (Handler, J., dissenting).
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The majority's extension of the scope of fireman's rule
immunity reflected both the practical realities of emergency calls
as well as the current trend in New Jersey case law. A firefighter
or police officer enters an emergency scene under no illusion that
the premises have been made safe for his arrival. Rather, the officer has been trained and is paid to anticipate, and to deal with,
the inherently dangerous circumstances of such a situation. In
other words, it is part of an officer's professional duty to expect
the unexpected.
The court prudently refused to encumber a property owner
with the burden of fixing all negligently-created hazards on his
premises before making an emergency call for police or
firefighter assistance. Such a burden would discourage a citizen
from summoning officers for fear of liability claims against him
for negligence. The court, through its broadening of the fireman's rule, wisely avoided this undesirable result.
In addition to the favorable practical impact of its decision,
the Rosa court refined the fireman's rule in a manner consistent
with the direction of the court in prior cases. The court has gradually sought to expand the umbrella of fireman's rule immunity
in order to reach a more equitable distribution of the duties and
liabilities involved in an officer's emergency arrival upon a private citizen's premises. By immunizing an ordinary act of negligence which constituted an inherent part of an officer's duty of
performance, the Rosa court took a significant step in achieving
this goal.
While the majority crafted a reasonable and entirely necessary extension of the fireman's rule, the court left unaddressed
the circumstance where an off-duty officer, or an on-duty officer
functioning as a private citizen, enters an establishment and is
suddenly called to an emergency situation within the same facility. If such an officer is injured by an ordinary act of negligence
before reaching the emergency situation, does the fireman's rule
immunize that negligence? One may question whether the risk of
that negligence falls within such an officer's duty of performance.
If the answer to this inquiry is no, then the fireman's rule would
not afford immunity for the property owner's negligence. The
Rosa dissent may have contemplated this type of situation in its
criticism that courts and juries will unfailingly struggle to apply
the untenable "inherent risk" standard established by the majority. Id. at 82, 583 A.2d at 1137-38 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Notwithstanding such concern over a novel burden placed upon
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the judicial process, the majority's extension of fireman's rule immunity constitutes a thoughtful balancing of the equities involved in an officer's response to the emergency call of a private
citizen.
In Rosa, the court advanced a thoroughly viable and essential clarification of fireman's rule immunity. Not only does its
decision reverberate with a keen understanding of the realities of
emergency responses by firefighters and police officers, but the
court also protected the public's longstanding reliance upon such
public servants in time of crisis, for private citizens will not be
forced to weigh the direness of the emergency against their potential liability for negligence in deciding whether to make a call
for firefighter or police aid. Thus, the court successfully strode a
narrow path. The Rosa decision effectively served important policy concerns while, at the same time, fully effectuated the reasonable expectations of firefighters and police officers.
Edwin F. Chociey

INSURANCE-EQUITABLE
SCINDED

FRAUD-LIFE INSURANCE

POLICY RE-

WHERE DECEASED APPLICANT'S FALSE STATEMENTS

WOULD HAVE AFFECTED INSURER'S ESTIMATE OF RISK-Mas-

sachusetts Mutualv. Manzo, 122 N.J. 104, 584 A.2d 190 (1991).
InJune 1983, Albert Manzo applied for a life insurance policy with Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (Mass.
Mutual). 122 NJ. at 107, 584 A.2d at 191. The application contained one clause which indicated that all statements were true to

the best of Manzo's knowledge and another clause that stated
that no proceeds would be paid unless "at the time of payment
• . . all statements in the application are complete and true as
though they were made at the time." Id. at 107-08, 584 A.2d at

191. Subsequently, Mass. Mutual issued a $500,000 policy to
Manzo.
On August 22, 1983, Manzo died from gun shot wounds. Id.
at 108, 584 A.2d at 192. Following an investigation, Mass. Mutual discovered that Manzo committed equitable fraud on his life
insurance application by intentionally failing to reveal a lengthy
history of diabetes and other related problems. Id. at 108-09,
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584 A.2d at 192. Mass. Mutual thereafter filed suit against
Manzo's beneficiaries seeking rescission. Id. at 109, 584 A.2d at
192.
After a non-jury trial, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, determined that Manzo possessed knowledge of
his medical condition when he signed the life insurance application. Id. at 110, 584 A.2d at 193. In addition, the-court found
that Mass. Mutual relied on Manzo's false statements in setting
the premiums, providing for a premium waiver, and ultimately
issuing the policy to Manzo. Id. As a result, the court concluded
that Manzo committed equitable fraud and ordered rescission of
the policy. Id.
In a divided opinion, the Appellate Division reversed and
held that Mass. Mutual did not prove Manzo's condition either
caused his death or rendered him uninsurable. Id. The court ordered reformation and granted the beneficiaries the full amount
of the proceeds, minus the premium increase Manzo would have
paid if Mass. Mutual knew of his disease. Id. Due to the appellate
division's lack of unanimity, the case was automatically reviewed
by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the appellate
court's ruling. Id. at 111, 584 A.2d at 193. Justice Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, held that equitable fraud may be utilized as a basis for post-loss recission of a life insurance policy.
Id. The court concluded that an insurance policy may be rescinded, within the statutory two-year period of contestability,
where an applicant's false statements would have affected the insurer's estimate of risk. Id.
Initially, the court addressed the fairness of invoking postdeath equitable fraud. Id. The court noted New Jersey's recognition of the availibility of equitable fraud after an insured has died.
Id. (citing Formosa v. Equitable Life InsuranceSoc'y, 166 N.J.Super. 8,
13, 398 A.2d 1301, 1304 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 81 N.J. 53, 404
A.2d 1153 (1979)(citations omitted)). The court read this rule in
conjunction with the applicable statute which stated that an insurance policy is incontestable, except for premium non-payment, once it has been in force during the insured's lifetime for a
two-year period after its issue date. Id. at 112, 584 A.2d at 194
(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:25-4 (West 1990)). The court construed the statutory language narrowly and noted that it revealed
no intention of terminating this period after the death of the insured. Id. Accordingly, the court held that Mass. Mutual could
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invoke equitable fraud as grounds for rescission because it contested the policy before the statutory period ended. Id. at 11213, 584 A.2d at 194.
Subsequently, the court questioned whether the statute required "intent to defraud" on behalf of the applicant. Id. at 11315, 584 A.2d at 194-95 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:24-3(d)(West
1990)). After rejecting the appellate division's conclusion that an
insurer must prove the applicant acted with an intent to deceive,
the court opined that the dispositive factor is the whether the applicant's false statements caused the insurer to act detrimentally.
Id. at 113, 584 A.2d at 194.
In addition, the court noted the legislature removed from
the predecessor statute the requirement that the insurer show actual intent to deceive. Id. at 113-14, 584 A.2d at 194. This deletion, the court proclaimed, evidenced the legislative purpose to
apply the current statute without any proof of the insured's intent. Id. at 114, 584 A.2d at 194 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:243(d)(West 1990)). Thus, the court concluded that since Manzo
intentionally lied on his application form and Mass. Mutual relied
on his misrepresentations, equitable fraud had been demonstrated. Id. at 114-15, 584 A.2d at 195.
The court recognized the disjunctive nature of the statute
which bars recovery for "material" misrepresentations that affect
either an insurer's decision to accept the risk of an applicant or
the hazard assumed by the insurer. Id. at 115-17, 584 A.2d at
195-96 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann § 17B:24-3(d)(West 1990)). In construing the meaning of materiality, the court rejected the appellate division's definition which included only those false
statements rendering an applicant uninsurable. Id. at 115, 584
A.2d at 195. The court found that this restrictive interpretation
would foster dishonesty because insurers would have a greater
burden proving that false statements rendered the applicant an
uninsurable risk. Id. The court surmised that this difficult burden of proof would enable dishonest applicants to incur no risk
when deceiving an insurance carrier. Id.
Justice Pollock observed that New Jersey courts have uniformly adopted a broader definition of materiality. Id. at 116,
584 A.2d at 195 (citing Kerpchak v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 97
N.J.L. 196, 198, 117 A. 836, 838 (1922)). This definition, noted
the court, encompasses any false statement that reasonably influences the decision of the insurance carrier in estimating the risk,
calculating the premiums, or accepting the ultimate application.
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Id. After concluding that was not meant to alter the definition of
materiality set forth in Kerpchak, the court found Manzo's misrepresentations on his insurance application reasonably and naturally affected Mass. Mutual's estimation of risk, as well as its
setting of premiums. Id. at 117, 584 A.2d at 196 (citing N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 17B:24-3(d) (West 1990)). The court concluded that if
Mass. Mutual had known Manzo's true medical history it would
have incurred a greater risk, and thus required a premium two
and one-half times greater than the rate charged. Id. Accordingly, the court held that Manzo's false statements were material
and that Mass. Mutual was entitled to rescind the policy. Id.
Finally, the court rejected the appellate division's interpretation of the statute which required that the insured's false statements be causally connected to the ultimate cause of death. Id. at
117-18, 584 A.2d at 1976-97. The court noted that New Jersey
precedent strongly rejected such a causal requirement between
an applicant's misrepresentations and the ultimate cause of
death. Id. at 118, 584 A.2d at 196-97 (citation omitted). Adopting the rule of the majority ofjurisdictions, Justice Pollock stated
that an insurer may rescind an insurance policy when it relies on
false information that materially affected either the terms of the
policy or its decision to insure, regardless of whether the cause of
death was related to the misrepresentations. Id at 118, 584 A.2d
at 197 (citations omitted). This rule, the court declared, encourages insurance applicants to act honestly and conforms with the
legislative intent of the applicable statute. Id. (citing N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 17B:24-3(d) (West 1990).
In an effort to maintain the rights and expectations of both
parties to an insurance contract, the Manzo Court provided a
clear ruling supported by strong policy considerations. Recognizing the importance of life insurance in our society, the court
justifiably barred any recovery based on an insurance policy
tainted by fraud. By precluding the beneficiaries from escaping
liability simply because Manzo's death was unrelated to the misrepresentations made on his insurance application, the court forcibly deters individuals from circumventing the expressed
truthfulness requirements in an insurance agreement. If the
court were to tolerate the slightest misrepresentation the integrity of insurance protection would be severely jeopardized.
Robert T Abramson
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PROPERTY-AFFORDABLE HOUSING TAXES-DEED RESTRICTION
ON

THE

RESALE

RIGHT

OF Low-

AND

MODERATE-INCOME

HOUSING MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING THE VALUE OF
OWNER'S PROPERTY INTEREST FOR LOCAL TAX PURPOSES-

Wayne Prowitz v. Ridgefield Park Village, Kathleen Dunleavy v.
Ridgefield Park Village, 122 N.J. 199, 584 A.2d 782 (1991).
The Housing Development Corporation (HDC), a nonprofit
corporation controlled by the Bergen County Housing Authority
(the Authority), operates the housing authority's affordable housing program.' 237 N.J. Super. 435, 437, 568 A.2d 114, 115
(1989). In the early 1980's, HDC built single-family condominium units on land it obtained in the Village of Ridgefield Park
(Ridgefield Park). The condominium projects were established
under master deeds pursuant to the requirements of the applicable statute. Id. (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-8 (West 1986)).
Additionally, initial purchasers of the condominium units were
required to qualify as low- to-moderate-income earning families
in order to acquire a unit.
The Authority deemed the plaintiffs, Wayne Prowitz and Denis and Kathleen Dunleavy (the Dunleavys) to be of low or moderate financial means. Consequently, HDC sold the Dunleavys a
condominium unit for $40,000 in 1981 and sold Wayne Prowitz a
condominium unit for $42,000 in 1983 in separate condominium
projects in Ridgefield Park. Id., 568 A.2d at 115-16. The master
deeds and the single unit deeds for the condominium projects
contained restrictions on the resale rights of each owner. Id. at
437-38, 568 A.2d at 116. The deed restriction at issue provides
that upon resale of the unit the owner can only charge the original purchase price as adjusted by a consumer price index factor.
Id. at 438, 568 A.2d at 116. Further, the deed restriction grants
HDC a first option to buy the unit. Id. If HDC does not exercise
its option, the owners are limited to selling the condominum unit
to a family that the Authority deems to be eligible for low- and
moderate-income housing. Id. Nevertheless, once an eligible
person owns a unit, the person may retain possession of the unit
even after exceeding the initial purchase income eligibility requirements. Id.
1 122 N.J. 199, 200, 584 A.2d 782, 783 (1991). The NewJersey Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, and
adopted the Appellate Division opinion written by Judge Sylvia B. Pressler at 237
N.J. Super. 435, 568 A.2d 114 (1989).
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The Fair Housing Act of 1985 (the Act) and the Council on
Affordable Housing (COAH) were established by the legislature
after the Authority began its affordable housing program. Id.
HDC generally adheres to the requirements of the Act and
COAH. Therefore, the HDC condominum units were considered to be affordable housing as defined by the Act, even though
Ridgefield Park has not been a party to Mount Laurel litigation
which mandates participation in New Jersey's standardized affordable housing program. Id. (citing So. Burl. Cty N.A.A.C.P. v.
Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975); So. Burl. Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v.
Mt. Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158 (1983)).
In 1986, Ridgefield Park reevaluated its tax assessment policies. Id. No tax assessment policy had ever been established or
discussed by Ridgefield Park and the Authority as to the affordable housing units. Id. As a result of the reevaluation, Ridgefield
Park valued the affordable housing units at their fair market value
for tax purposes notwithstanding the deed restrictions. Id. at
438-39, 568 A.2d at 116. In so doing, Prowitz's tax assessment
basis was increased to $86,300 and the Dunleavy valuation was
increased to $84,600. Id. at 439, 568 A.2d at 116.
On appeal to the Bergen County Board of Taxation, Prowitz
and the Dunleavy's argued that the deed restriction limiting resale of the unit resulted in a diminution of each unit's fair market
value; hence, the fair market value of the units should be limited
to the maximum resale price of $46,987 for Prowitz's unit and
$46,864 for Dunleavy's unit. Id. The County Board of Taxation
upheld the valuation at full fair market value, and on appeal, the
Tax Court reaffirmed the valuations. Id. The Superior Court of
New Jersey, Appellate Division reversed the Tax Court's decision
and held that the deed restriction must be considered when valuing the condominium units. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court
granted certification and affirmed. 122 N.J. 199, 200, 584 A.2d
782, 783 (1991). Rather than writing a full majority opinion, the
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of the appellate division. Id.
Judge Pressler, writing for the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, began her analysis by noting the New Jersey
constitutional requirement that the value of all real property
should be assessed pursuant to "the same standard of value."
237 N.J. Super. 439, 568 A.2d at 116 (citing N.J. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1, 1 (1947)). The NewJersey Legislature had interpreted the
true-value standard as the price at which the property could sell
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for in an arms' length transaction by private contract. Id. Based
on the New Jersey constitutional requirement and the Legislature's definition of true-value, Judge Pressler concluded that the
deed restriction substantially affected the price under the truevalue standard. Id.
Judge Pressler distinguished between an encumbrance on title and an encumbrance on land by stating that an encumbrance
on title typically entails a temporary restriction upon a particular
owner that may be cured. Id. at 440, 568 A.2d at 117. The Judge
reasoned that the restriction does not affect the property's resale
value because the owner has an interest in all the land and enjoys
the whole title. Id. On the other hand, Judge Pressler stated that
an encumbrance on land typically affects the use and disposition
of the land. Id. The Judge determined that an encumbrance on
land, such as an easement imposed by governmental regulation
diminishes the value of the land and, therefore, should be considered in valuing the land. Id. at 440-41, 568 A.2d at 117 (citing
Englewood Cliffs v. Estate of Allison, 69 N.J. Super, 514, 174 A.2d
631 (App. Div. 1961)). Judge Pressler reasoned that a restrictive
covenant in a deed for the benefit of the public burdens and
reduces the value of the land much like an encumbrance on land.
Id. at 442, 568 A.2d at 118. The Judge determined that the deed
restriction limits the owner's ability to use and sell the property.
Id. Judge Pressler noted several governmental regulations that
create similar restraints and diminish the value of land for tax
purposes. Id., 568 A.2d at 118. For example, Judge Pressler
found that environmental clean-up requirements and zoning regulations are permanent and incurable limitations that reduce the
value of land. Id.
Evaluating the facts of the case, the appellate division held
that the deed restriction limiting the maximum resale price
clearly diminished the property value of the condominium units.
Id. Judge Pressler stressed that the deed restriction was created
to benefit the public by increasing affordable housing in New
Jersey. Id. at 442-43, 568 A.2d at 118. Judge Pressler opined
that it is irrelevant if, after purchasing the affordable housing
units, the owner exceeds the initial income eligibility restrictions
because the purpose of affordable housing is to give families an
opportunity to better themselves. Id. at 443, 568 A.2d. at 118.
Hence, the public benefit is the quidpro quo for reducing the value
of the property by imposing a deed restriction. Id. Judge
Pressler further analogized the deed restriction to the govern-
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mental regulations created by the Fair Housing Act and COAH.
Id. The Judge stated that both the deed restriction and the governmental regulations create affordable housing programs as defined by Mount Laurel. Id. Finally, Judge Pressler compared the
deed restriction to a protective tax statute. Id., 568 A.2d at 119.
Judge Pressler found that in both instances the resale price of
property is significantly diminished by governmental actions
taken by the government to provide housing for a group designated as in need of such assistance. Id. at 443-44, 568 A.2d at
119. Judge Pressler stated that in this case the burden of the restriction is on the private owner because the restriction reduces
the value of the owner's interest in the property. The Judge reasoned that this burden is justified by public policy favoring affordable housing. Id. Thus, it is only equitable that the public
help allieviate the burden on the private owner by recognizing
that deed restrictions on resale reduce the underlying value of
the property for tax assessment purposes. Id. at 444, 568 A.2d at
119.
Justice Stein of the New Jersey Supreme Court concurred
with the majority affirming the appellate division's finding that
the deed restriction reduced the value of the condominium units
for tax assessment purposes. 122 N.J. 199, 200, 584 A.2d. 782,
783 (1991) (Stein, J., concurring). Justice Stein, however,
warned of the risks inherent in permitting owners who later exceed the initial financial eligibility requirement to remain in possession of the units and take advantage of the tax assessment
reduction. Id. at 200-01, 584 A.2d at 783 (Stein, J., concurring).
Although recognizing that such a regulatory scheme was enacted
to limit mandatory evictions, Justice Stein noted that the problem
could remedy itself if the owners seek housing of better quality as
their financial situation improves. Id. at 201, 584 A.2d at 783
(Stein, J., concurring).
On the other hand, Justice Stein determined that if owners
who exceed the initial financial purchase requirements remain in
possession, the justification for the reduced tax assessment
would be diminished. Id. Further, the Justice stated that the
deed restriction would no longer serve a valid public benefit. Id.
Justice Stein recognized that the public purpose of the deed restriction has not yet been frustrated by dilution; however, the justification for the reduced tax assessment is only valid if the deed
restriction continues to act as a public benefit. Id. at 201-02, 584
A.2d at 784 (Stein, J., concurring).
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In Prowitz, the New Jersey Supreme Court mandated that the
deed restriction on the resale value of affordable housing units
must be considered when imposing tax assessments; hence, owners of affordable housing units shall not be taxed at full fair market value. The New Jersey Supreme Court has again
transgressed the limits of its judicial powers, for creating tax
standards is a legislative responsibility. Further, the supreme
court has neglected its responsibility by adopting the views of the
appellate division rather than writing its own opinion. If the
court authored its own opinion it could have recognized the legitimate concerns expressed by Justice Stein and anticipate the
possible need to revisit the present affordable housing scheme in
New Jersey. Finally, the court could have called upon the legislature to enact a statute pertaining to the tax assessment of affordable housing units.
Nevertheless, establishing a uniform tax assessment standard for affordable housing units in New Jersey is laudable. Requiring the deed restriction to be considered for tax assessment
purposes comports with the purpose of Mount Laurel housing for
it continues to provide and promote the public benefit of affordable housing. Additionally, authorizing a lower tax assessment alleviates the danger that present owners of low- and moderateincome housing units will not be able to afford tax assessments
based on the full fair market value of the condominium units.
Therefore, Prowitz ensures a realistic opportunity for families to
reside in towns typically open only to families living in middleand upper-income housing which generate substantial taxes to
support the local government. Consequently, it is evident that
the Prowitz decision benefits the public and not the local tax collector.
Raquel Smith Colby

SURVEY

1991]
NEGLIGENCE
HOME

-

HEALTH

AWARD -

DAMAGES
CARE

-

IS

975

VALUE OF GRATUITOUSLY PROVIDED
PERMISSIBLE

ELEMENT

OF DAMAGE

Bandel v. Freidrich, 122 N.J. 235, 584 A.2d 800

(1991).
In May 1983, William Bandel experienced fever, chills, and
lower abdominal pain. 122 N.J. at 238, 584 A.2d at 802. He was
examined and treated by Dr. Charles Friedrich and later by a second physician. Both doctors failed to examine Bandel's blood or
urine for the presence of bacteria. By the time Bandel's condition
was diagnosed as bacterial endocarditis, the disease had
progressed into his brain and heart. As a result, two operations
were necessary. These operations caused severe complications,
including a stroke. Consequently, Bandel was left permanently
disabled. He requires 24 hour continuous care and supervision.
His ability to communicate with others has been greatly impaired
and he can only tend to his most basic bodily functions without
assistance. For over three years prior to trial, Bandel's mother,
Bessie, cared for almost all his needs without compensation.
Bandel sued the treating physicians, hospitals and clinic for
negligent diagnosis. Id. at 236, 584 A.2d at 801. The defendant
asserted that Bandel had no duty to pay his mother for her services and since Mrs. Bandel was under no obligation to provide
care, the collateral source rule should act as a bar to recovery. Id.
at 241, 584 A.2d at 803-04. At trial, the jury found Dr. Friedrich
20% negligent, the plaintiff 10% negligent, and a second doctor
70% negligent. Id. The damages were calculated at $720,000, of
which Dr. Friedrich's assessment was $144,000. Id. at 237, 584
A.2d at 801. The trial court refused to allow the "reasonable
value of gratuitously provided services" in the damages calculation. Id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed
the negligence findings, but remanded for a new trial on damages. Id. The court held that Bandel could "recover the reasonable value of these necessary services provided without cost by a
caring mother." Id.(citation omitted).
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification on the
issue of recovery for gratuitously provided services. Id.(citation
omitted). The court found that the value of home health care
provided without charge was an appropriate element of damages.
Id. at 241, 584 A.2d at 803.
Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, acknowl-
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edged that New Jersey is a latecomer to the issue of allowing recovery for gratuitously provided health care services. Id. at 239,
584 A.2d at 802. The court noted that a majority of other jurisdictions have allowed plaintiffs' recovery for such services. Id.
The court determined that this majority rule was consistent with
prior New Jersey decisions on compensatory damages. Id. at 240,
584 A.2d at 803 (citations omitted). These rulings, Justice Handler reiterated, maintained that the plaintiff's inability to care for
himself or to take part in physical activity were proper elements
of damages. Id. Accordingly, the court reasoned that a proper
damages calculation must include consideration of the inability
to do the "mundane tasks necessary and incidental to daily existence." Id. at 241, 584 A.2d at 803.
The court examined the application of the collateral source
rule as a possible bar to recovery because Bandel never actually
paid for his mother's services. Id. at 241, 584 A.2d at 803. The
court stressed that "ordinarily a tortfeasor may not set up in mitigation of damages payments made to injured persons from collateral sources." Id., 584 A.2d at 804 (citing Long v. Landy, 35
N.J. 44, 55, 171 A.2d 1 (1961). Thus, Justice Handler concluded
that plaintiff's recovery should include the costs of required services even if there is no actual payment made for them. Id. The
wrongdoer, the court stated, should not be allowed to escape his
duty to fully compensate the victim simply because a third party
has fortuitously provided services without compensation. Id. at
242, 584 A.2d at 804. The court asserted that there was no difference between a payor who gratuitously pays for someone else to
supply plaintiff's needs and a provider who personally supplies
the needs without compensation. Id. Either way, the plaintiff is
being furnished with the assistance he requires as a direct result
of the tortfeasor's wrong. Id. The court recognized that this statute was not applicable in the present case. Id.
The court emphasized that the valuation of home health care
services should pose no obstacle to recovery. Id. The majority
contended that the measure of these services should be the "reasonable cost of having a third party perform those activities." Id.
at 241, 584 A.2d at 803. Justice Handler posited that Bessie
Bandel's care of her son was essentially equivalent to that of a
nurse. Id. The justice concluded that the wrongdoer's obligation
to fully compensate the victim was not decreased because the
services were provided gratuitously. Id. at 244, 584 A.2d at 805.
This holding brings New Jersey in line with the majority of
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jurisdictions which include gratuitously provided home health
care services in a damage verdict. New Jersey tort victims now
can receive compensation for required services whether or not
those services are provided free of charge. The goal of a damage
award should be to fully compensate the injured party for the
wrong done to him. Necessarily, the award should encompass
damages for the inability to care for oneself. A tortfeasor should
not receive an undeserved windfall because the victim is fortunate enough to have someone care for him without charge. If
Bandel had paid a third party to attend to all his daily needs there
would have been no question of inclusion in the final calculation
of damages. Therefore, a party who prefers to have an unpaid
relative or friend care for him or a victim who is too poor to pay
out-of-pocket expenses for third party services will no longer be
at a disadvantage when a final damage award is calculated.
Anne K Brown

CRIMINAL LAW-DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED-DEFENDANT'S
LAWFUL U-TURN TO AVOID A DWI CHECKPOINT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR POLICE TO CHASE AND DETAIN, IF POLICE
PROCEDURE IS OBJECTIVE AND REASONABLE-State

v.

Hester,

245 N.J. Super. 75, 584 A.2d 256 (App. Div. 1990).
Cleve Hester, Jr. (Hester), the defendant, was driving on
Route 322 in Egg Harbor Township in the early morning hours
of September 4, 1989. 245 N.J. Super. at 77, 584 A.2d at 257.
The local police authorities had set up a roadblock to determine
if any drivers were inebriated. Id. Hester was travelling in the
direction of the driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) roadblock, but
made a lawful U-turn approximately 300-400 feet before the
checkpoint, and then proceeded in the opposite direction. Id. at
77-78, 584 A.2d at 257. The defendant's actions were not in violation of any motor vehicle regulations. Id. at 78, 584 A.2d at
257. A police officer, however, witnessed Hester's actions, gave

pursuit, and subsequently detained him. The officer was operating under the presumption that the driver was intoxicated because he purposely avoided the checkpoint.
Upon stopping the defendant, the officer determined that
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Hester was sober. Id. After a routine check of defendant's driving credentials, however, the officer discovered that defendant's
license had been revoked. Id. Accordingly, defendant was issued
a summons for driving with a revoked license. Id. (citing N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:3-40 (West 1990)).
The municipal court judge entered an order suppressing the
evidence that was obtained pursuant to the stop. Id. at 77, 584
A.2d at 257. The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, affirmed the order, specifically on the grounds that the detention
of defendant's car was a violation of the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution as well as a violation of the New
Jersey Constitution, Article 1, Paragraph 7. Id. The New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division, granted the state's motion
for appeal. Id. In reversing the order of suppression, the court
remanded the matter for further proceedings at the municipal
court level. Id. The court held that the defendant's lawful Uturn, which allowed avoidance of the DWI checkpoint, provided,
without more, a valid basis for the police to pursue and stop the
suspect vehicle. Id. at 82, 584 A.2d at 259.
Judge Shebell, writing for the appellate panel, began the
court's analysis by pointing out that the issue presented for resolution did not include the threshold question of whether DWI
roadblocks are constitutional. Id. at 78, 584 A.2d at 257. The
court took notice that the defendant had already conceded that
issue in order to argue the validity of being stopped incidental to
a DWI roadblock. Id. The court articulated that recent developments in the United States Supreme Court's analysis of DWI jurisprudence in which a balancing test was imposed (balancing the
state's interest for safety against the individual's protection from
governmental intrusion) supports the state's position in the present matter. Id. at 79, 584 A.2d at 258 (citations omitted). Judge
Shebell asserted that when this balancing test is applied to DWI
checkpoints, the state established the constitutionality of its actions due to its compelling interest in preventing accidents by
drunken drivers and the effective use of roadblocks. Id.
The judge further opined that the intrusion into a driver's
freedom of movement was not unreasonable because the time
spent in the stop was minimal and the basis for the questioning
provided a compelling state justification. Id. The court referred
to a United States Supreme Court opinion which clearly disapproved of random stops to arrest unlicensed drivers or unsafe
vehicles. Id. at 78, 584 A.2d at 257 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440
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U.S. 648 (1979)). The court explained in Prouse that random
stops were not as effective a method in promoting road safety as
organized DWI checkpoints. Id. at 79, 584 A.2d at 258. Further,
the Supreme Court has clearly enunciated that DWI roadblocks
were not violative of the fourth amendment. Id.
Judge Shebell next considered the defendant's argument
that a citizen, relying on both Supreme Court decisions as well as
New Jersey decisions, had the right to legally avoid a DWI stop
and therefore avoid police confrontation. Id. at 80, 584 A.2d at
258 (citing Floridav. Rover, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); State v. Kirk, 202
N.J. Super. 28 (App. Div. 1985); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479
A.2d 903 (1984)). Relying on the Little opinion, the defendant
contended that the fact that Maryland allowed the motorist to
choose whether to submit to the stop, make a U-turn, or proceed
without interference through the checkpoint was an essential
condition of the constitutionality of a DWI checkpoint. Id. The
defendant asserted that under the New Jersey Constitution, the
court should find it untenable to stop a motorist simply because
he chose to avoid the DWI checkpoint in a lawful manner. Id.
The court criticized and rejected this interpretation of the
Little opinion and emphasized that the availability of choice was
viewed by the Maryland court only as ameliorating elements
which served to convince the court that the roadblock represented a minimal intrusion upon an individual's freedom. Id. at
80-81, 584 A.2d at 258-59 (citation omitted). Judge Shebell reasoned that the absence of these factors in the New Jersey roadblock procedure did not conversely invalidate it. Id. In addition,
the judge posited that the court must evaluate all factors involved
in order to use a balancing test for a specific roadblock procedure. Id. at 81, 584 A.2d at 258. The court found that the purpose and effectiveness of preventing drunk driving through use
of DWI checkpoints was the dispositive factor. Id., 584 A.2d at
259.
Judge Shebell stressed there was no prerequisite that the
motorist be afforded an opportunity to avoid the DWI checkpoint
in order to validate the constitutionality of the procedure. Id.
The judge reiterated that when the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutional validity of DWI roadblocks to apprehend drunken drivers it specifically pronounced that such police
action did not violate the protection against "seizure" under the
fourth amendment. Id. The judge further found that police action which intentionally interferes with a motorist's freedom does
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not violate the fourth amendment. Id. (citation omitted). In addition, Judge Shebell reasoned that because the Sitz holding did
not include any indication whether the DWI checkpoint procedure allowed the driver to avoid the stop, it was presumed to be
of less importance than the state's compelling interest in constructing an effective procedure to prevent drunk driving. Id.
The judge declined to extend a broader protection to a motorist under the New Jersey Constitution than would have been
extended under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. The court enunciated that allowing a motorist to
choose whether or not to participate in a DWI checkpoint would
result in a less effective program that may even create the very
danger it was designed to eliminate. Id. Nonetheless, the judge
emphasized that the checkpoint procedure must be reasonable
and objective. Id. at 82, 584 A.2d at 259. Accordingly, Judge
Shebell found that the trial record lacked information concerning
the notice afforded to the motorist and whether, at the point of
making the lawful U-turn, the motorist actually could have observed the roadblock. Id. This information would be critical in
determining whether Hester anticipated that his avoidance of the
checkpoint would result in a police pursuit and whether the police procedure was reasonable. Id. The court cautioned that inducing a motorist to believe he could make a lawful U-turn to
avoid a DWI checkpoint, and then pursuing the motorist because
the U-turn was interpreted as a suspicious evasion of the roadblock, was not reasonable police procedure. Id.
Judge Shebell concluded the court's analysis by holding that
because the seizure was reasonably initiated, the pursuit and detention of the defendant were constitutional. Id. at 82-83, 584
A.2d at 259-60. The judge reversed the order of suppression
and remanded the proceedings to the municipal court to determine whether a reasonable driver would have known that the police procedure required the motorist to proceed into the DWI
checkpoint. Id. at 83, 584 A.2d at 260.
As a case of first impression, this opinion reflects judicial
support of the public policy to eliminate drunken drivers from
the state's roadways. Few would argue that the state should be
passive in confronting the horror of the drunken driver and the
havoc he or she represents. The judiciary must be careful, however, not to overlook the safeguards afforded the reasonable
driver when approaching a DWI roadblock. The constitutionality
of the DWI procedure has been clearly affirmed by the Supreme
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Court. Accordingly, Judge Shebell correctly concluded that the
New Jersey roadblock was constitutional despite not allowing the
motorist the choice of whether or not to participate.
The more important question, however, concerns whether
the motorist was notified that he did not have a choice, whether
he was required to proceed into the upcoming checkpoint, and
whether he received notice before the point at which he was allowed to make a lawful U-turn. If the motorist never saw roadblock signs or the roadblock itself before he made the U-turn, he
was not avoiding the stop. The police detention would then be
arbitrary and unreasonable. If he did see the signs or roadblock
but was not informed that he was required to proceed into the
roadblock, his subsequent detention might be unreasonable.
There is a strong presumption that a motorist who intentionally avoids a DWI roadblock does so because he is intoxicated.
The Hester court concluded that both public policy and the use of
objective law enforcement procedures make it reasonable for the
police to detain such motorists. The better alternative is to reduce the motorist's misconception about his available rights by
clearly notifying him to proceed to the roadblock before he is
given the opportunity to make a lawful U-turn. This point-intime notification may well be the essential element necessary to
both protect the motorist's rights and advance the compelling
state interest.
The reasonableness of stopping the motorist incidental to a
DWI checkpoint, without more, is too amorphous and potentially
arbitrary not to be clarified by specific guidelines. Eitherjudicial
or legislative guidelines must provide the accuracy that both the
motorist and police require and deserve. Judge Shebell, in remanding the proceedings to decide the specific issue of motorist
awareness, has taken an important first step in clearing up the
uncomfortable dichotomy between eliminating drunken drivers
through reasonable police procedures and protecting an innocent driver against an arbitrary pursuit incident to a DWI checkpoint.
Gloria L. Buxbaum

